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1.   Commodities and the role of the Common Fund for Commodities 
 
Commodities, a mainstay of the economy 
 
Commodities are a mainstay of the economies of most developing countries, providing food, 
income-generating opportunities and export earnings to at least 2.4 billion people directly 
employed in agriculture.  LDCs are highly commodity-dependent; in Africa, more than half of 
the countries derive over 80% of their merchandise export income from commodities. 
Commodity-dependence has been aggravated by adverse trends: declining prices for 
primary commodities, higher input prices, deteriorating terms of trade, and high price 
volatility: a major factor of the steep rise of the numbers of poor particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the 1990s. In its report on World Agriculture towards 2030
1, the FAO states 
that,  
 
Seven out of ten of the world’s poor still live in rural areas. Growth in the agricultural 
sector has a crucial role to play in improving the incomes of poor people, by providing 
farm jobs and stimulating off-farm employment.  
 
These adverse trends can only be reversed if more emphasis is placed on value addition, 
particularly through agricultural processing and efficient trade in commodities. Finance, ie, 
access to sustainable financial services, has a crucial role to play. All this falls under the 
mandate of the Common Fund for Commodities. 
 
The CFC, promoting commodities
2 with a special emphasis on LDCs and the poor 
 
The Common Fund for Commodities, based on an agreement concluded within UNCTAD in 
1980, was established in 1989 and started operating in 1991 to address issues related to 
more efficient production, processing and trade in commodities. The Common Fund is an 
autonomous intergovernmental financial organisation of 106  country members and three 
institutional members (EC, AU and COMESA) within the framework of the United Nations. In 
contrast to most other international bodies, the CFC focuses on commodities, rather than 
countries or rural development and livelihoods enhancement in general. The Fund’s 
comparative advantage of  supporting solutions applicable on a wider scale has resulted in a 
large multiplier effect of each dollar spent.  
 
Its main instrument are grants, which account for 84% of its overall assistance, 
supplemented by loans (16%). The Fund has played a catalytic role in attracting additional 
funds from other development institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations. 
This has resulted in a co-financing ratio of 51%.  
 
Since 1991, the Fund has approved 114 regular projects, averaging US$ 3.0 million, and 43 
fast track projects (mainly studies and workshops)
3. The projects fall into four broad 
categories, the majority of them with an emphasis on the enhancement of value addition:  
 
•  Pre-harvest productivity improvement including research (35%) 
•  Post-harvest processing, marketing and quality testing (36%) 
•  Market expansion (26% 
•  Price risk management (3%). 
                                                 
1 Executive Summary, p. 2. 
2 The Fund lists 93 commodities that may be promoted. Among the 89 agricultural and related 
commodities are bamboo and rattan, bananas, citrus fruit, cocoa, coffee, cotton, fish, grains, hard 
fibres, hides and skins, jute, oils and oilseeds, rubber, sugar, tea, and tropical timber. There are four 
non-agricultural commodities: copper, lead, nickel and zinc. 
3 November 2002 data. The overall project cost are US$ 342.9 million, of which the Fund financed 
US$ 166.9 million.   2
 
Since 1998, the Fund has concentrated on the commodity concerns of LDCs and the poorer 
strata of the population, including smallholders and small enterprises.  The projects have 
operating sites in approximately 100 countries: 
 
•  43% in Africa, 
•  26% in Asia  
•  27% in Latin America and the Caribbean 
•  4% in industrialised countries, with an emphasis on research and technology 
transfer. 
 
The current Five-Year Action Plan, 2003-07, reconfirms the commodity focus and the 
concentration on LDCs and the poor. New elements include a supply-chain approach, impact 
orientation, diversification, more dissemination activities, an international advocacy role, and 
the establishment of Trust Funds and Partnership Agreements. 
 
Completed projects have generally been found to have achieved their intended objectives, as 
for example in India where the Fund supported the adoption of new processing technologies 
by registered manufacturers of diversified jute products (DJP). This has resulted, over a four-
year period (1992/93-1996/97), in an increase in turnover from $15m to $87m; and of 
employment from 21,000 to 53,000. More than 1000 small enterprises are now involved. 
 
 
2.   A conference at a crossroads: the old and the new world of agricultural credit 
  and rural micro- and mesofinance 
 
The old and the new world of rural finance: customer perspectives 
 
You can tell a bank, or MFI, by looking at its customers: Does the bank make its customers 
unbankable, eg, by providing oversized medium-term loans and no deposit products as many 
agricultural development banks do? Does it keep them in poverty through standardized 
group loans without opportunities for accumulating voluntary savings or graduating to larger 
individual loans as many MFIs do? Or does it contribute to poverty alleviation and 
development by offering small and large loans, in addition to deposit facilities, along the 
commodity chain and for other purposes according to its customers’ capacity?
4  
 
The first case is a customer of Centenary Rural Development Bank in Uganda. Centenary is 
a particularly interesting case because it took over 10 branches from Cooperative Bank, a 
failed government-owned AgDB. Where the AgDB failed, Centenary is making a profit – for 
its own benefit and that of its customers:  
 
The woman-entrepreneur who financed diverse micro-enterprise start-ups along the 
commodity chain through savings from farming and their expansion through credit: 
Nandina Zauma is 35, married and has four children, 13-20 years old. In 1983, she started with 
a small rice farm. To protect her savings from inflation, she put up a building for a rice mill in 
1992, continued saving and actually installed a mill in 1996 – all self-financed from the proceeds 
of her farm. Since 1999, she received four loans from Centenary, each amounting to Ush 2 
million ($1,150). She first purchased a second mill, then expanded her produce trading 
operations, and finally bought two minibuses. During this 2½-year period, the total value of her 
business operations grew from Ush 6 million to 14 million ($8,000). She has two full-time 
employees and several contract laborers. 
 
                                                 
4 The case studies were done in 2001 as part of an IFAD study of Women and Men in Microfinance in 
Jordan, Syria and Uganda.   3
The following two case studies are from an agricultural finance institution in transition, ACC 
in Jordan, owned by the government. 
5The first case shows how supervised credit (for olives, 
in Tafila District) can go wrong, without repercussions on the prospects of the borrower to 
obtain further loans;  the second case shows how credit from the same institution (for 
vegetable production, in Karak District) can be profitably used by a capable small 
entrepreneur: 
 
The man who keeps planting olive trees, which all dry up 
Omar is 55 years old. He has seven children, 16-23 years old. In 1991 he received a first loan of 
JD 4,500 (US$ 6,345) with a maturity of 12-15 years from ACC for planting 300 olive trees and 
building a two-room house. The land is located on a dry plain, and the olive trees died. In June 
1992, he received an 8-year loan of JD 6,000 from an ACC goat smallholder project, which is 
now fully repaid. In the same year, he planted another 250 olive trees – from his own funds, he 
says. These also dried up. In 1999, at a time of continued drought, he replanted another 150 
olive trees, again from his own resources. In May 2000 he received a third loan from ACC: JD 
1,500 to add two rooms to his house. Why does he keep planting olive trees which all die? 
“Without an olive tree project, I have to return the loan at once,” he explained.  
 
Tamam, a successful horticultural entrepreneur 
Tamam is 40 years old and unmarried. In the village of Zahoum, she plants vegetables in 
several large plastic-covered greenhouses, which she transports to the market in her own truck 
and sells to wholesale traders. She employes three workers. In 1995 she received a first mid-
term loan of JD 4,000 from the ACC/IFAD Income Diversification Project to build the 
greenhouses. JD 800 remain outstanding. In 1997 she took a seasonal loan of JD 2,000 to plant 
vegetables. She has paid the interest; but as the loan fell under two government-directed 
reschedulings in 1998 and 2001, she has not repaid the principal. In May 2001, she took an 
Islamic (profit-sharing) loan of JD 8,543 with a maturity of 8 years to buy a tractor and install an 
irrigation system. Monthly payments are JD 45 for the 1995 loan and JD 116 for the 2001 loan. 
She lives on the income from her greenhouse operations. Due an oversupply on the market, 
prices for vegetables are currently (mid-2001) low, with monthly net profits of only JD 80 per 
month. At times of high prices, her monthly profit is between JD 300 and JD 500. She estimates 
the total value of her investment at JD 20,000 (US$ 28,200).  
 
 
The old world of agricultural credit 
 
During the first 10 or 12 years of its existence, the Fund has provided finance for the 
promotion of the commodity sector; but it has not directly supported local financial institutions 
to enhance their capacity of providing commodity finance from domestic resources. At the 
Fund’s inception in 1980, commodity finance was largely in the hands of agricultural 
development banks. Many of them had been set up during the 1960s as instruments of 
capital transfer, with massive donor assistance – on the mistaken assumption that capital 
was all that was lacking.   
 
At the time, during the 1950s and 60s and well into the 70s, there was international 
agreement on how to deal with low levels of agricultural productivity:  
 
￿ Given the level of poverty in the underdeveloped world, international experts advised 
governments to subsidize interest rates.  
￿ Given the level of illiteracy, international experts also advised government 
administrations to guide production through directed credit, with a strong emphasis on 
self-reliance in staple crops, supplemented by an emphasis on cash crops for export. 
 
Thus, governments owned AgDBs, subsidized interest rates and prompted production 
decisions. In many cases, crops were planted because of the availability of inputs including 
                                                 
5 The Agricultural  Credit Corporation, is now in the process of being transformed into a bank, 
benefiting from Nenaraca’s program on AgDB reform and the experience of other member institutions.   4
credit, not because soils were suitable and production was profitable. As a result commercial 
thinking was lacking, both in commodity production and commodity finance. Credit was 
scarce and was grabbed by small numbers of bigger farmers; outreach to the poor remained  
far behind expectations. Frequently, credit was provided to the wrong people (eg, with 
political connections) at the wrong time (eg, after the planting season) for the wrong 
purposes.  Neither bank staff nor the farmers took agricultural credit seriously, which had 
evolved into a political affair. Repayment rates turned out to be abysmally low – except when 
tied directly to outgrower schemes and marketing boards - and became an eternal drain on 
government and donor resources. In the process, banks, farmers and agricultural credit were 
seriously and permanently discredited.  
 
Due to the dismal performance of commodity finance and agricultural banks, many of the 
major donors, around 1980,  were pulling out their support. They left a void; no other type of 
institution seemed ready to take over. The rural banking (unit desa) program
6 of Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI), successfully reformed into a self-reliant financial intermediary as of 1984, 
appeared promising, but was a singular case; its transformation from a sinking ship to a 
flagship of rural finance came only later to international light.
7 Approximately at the same 
time, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand, today the 
only flagship of agricultural finance, was neither viable nor self-reliant in terms of resources.
8 
The newly emerging microfinance industry (a term that was only created in 1990) was neither 
ready nor significant. At the time, it had an urban bias and a donor bias towards credit NGOs. 
These belonged to the nonformal sector, were not authorized to mobilize savings as a source 
of loanable funds, and had therefore little potential for growth. Commodity finance was rarely 
on their agenda; not was it on the agenda of most emerging deposit-taking rural and 
microbanks The Fund was well-advised to stay away from that world of finance. Meanwhile, 
times have changed.  
 
 
The conference on commodity micro- and mesofinance  
 
Many commodity producers, processors and traders still lack access to microfinance 
services. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations 
Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), for example, estimate that 500 million economically 
active people worldwide still lack access to financial services. Concerns regarding access to 
credit of small commodity producers, processors and traders were raised by the Common 
Fund’s Working Group on Loans which met in the summer of 2000 to operationalise the 
Common Fund’s loans policy. One of their subsequent recommendations was that a seminar 
should be organised by the Secretariat of the Common Fund on microfinance: “to put into 
place a mechanism to deal with all relevant issues of microfinance by the Common Fund and 
to elaborate how the Common Fund could best use the instrument of microfinance to assist 
small commodity producers.” 
 
In cooperation with the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development as host, the CFC is 
now holding this international conference in Khartoum on Commodity Finance: From Micro- 
to Mesofinance for Agricultural Commodity Production, Processing and Trade.  The 
conference brings together existing positive experience in rural and microfinance and 
                                                 
6 Now reorganized and renamed as Microbusiness Division, the only (highly!) profitable division of 
BRI, with 3 million borrowers and 27 million savings accounts, to which the bank owed its survival 
during the Asian Financial Crisis.  
7 H. D. Seibel & P. Schmidt, How an Agricultural Development Bank Revolutionized Rural Finance:  
The Case of Bank Rakyat Indonesia. IFAD Rural Finance Working Paper No. B-5, Rome 1999/2000;  
K. Maurer & H. D. Seibel, Agricultural Development Bank Reform: The Case of Unit Banking System 
of Bank Rakyat Indonesia.  IFAD, Rome 2001 
8 K. Maurer, H. D. Seibel & S. Khadka, Agricultural Development Bank Reform: The Case of the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), Thailand. IFAD Rural Finance Working Paper 
No. 6-B. Rome 2000.   5
addresses the challenge of how to extend that experience to the commodity sector in a 
regional dimension, particularly – but not exclusively - in Africa and the Near East.  
 
The focus of the conference will be on new experience with adding value through finance for 
micro and small enterprises engaged in commodity production, processing and trade, with 
particular emphasis on agroprocessing. It is geared to two mutually reinforcing objectives:  
 
￿ making agricultural and agribusiness enterprises more efficient and more profitable;  
￿ making financial institutions more efficient and more profitable in providing financial 
services to the commodity sector. 
 
A number of critical issues will be presented, such as the financing of institutions vs. the 
financing of activities; conducive policies for both the financial and the commodity sector; 
self-financing vs. debt-financing; scaling up from micro to small enterprise and from micro- to 
mesofinance. Participants will have the opportunity of discussing in depth how to match 
demand-side strategies for the enhancement of commodity-related enterprises with supply-
side strategies for the enhancement of financial institutions and products. On that basis, we 
hope to arrive at new insights for local financial institutions as well as donors how to promote 
financial services for the benefit of hundreds of millions involved in the commodity chain  and 
the local institutions financing them.  
 
What at first sight appears as a return to the old world of agricultural credit with its focus on 
specific activities and commodities rather than financial institutions, regardless of profitability 
considerations, might turn out to be a major step in a new direction: exploring options for the 
new breed of sustainable financial institutions to finance profitable value-adding activities 
along the commodity chain that benefit both the investors and the financial institutions. 
 
Among the supporting financial instruments are equity, quasi-equity, loans, leasing, 
warehouse receipts, guarantees and commodity price insurance. Other support may include 
research, capacity-building, and the establishment and enhancement of commodity-related 
networks and associations, and information dissemination through conferences and ICTs. 
 
Together with the other participants, the Fund hopes to learn how the experience of 
institutions involved in microfinance could be applied to the further development of 
commodity production, processing and trade. 
 
The conference comes at a time of reorientation from the old world of directed credit to a new 
world of sustainable financial institution building. Since the 1960s, directed agricultural credit 
has brought doom to many of the implementing agricultural development banks, failed to 
generate rural development and alleviate poverty, and undermined the emergence of 
sustainable national and rural financial markets. There is hardly a country which does not 
suffer the consequences until today.  
 
Defining micro- and mesofinance 
 
Microfinance is a term first introduced in 1990. Originally the term was meant to refer to 
small-scale financial intermediation comprising both microsavings and microcredit, moving 
away from a sole emphasis on credit. Meanwhile, the term has been used in many different 
ways, connotating, eg, microcredit, group credit or Grameen banking. To avoid this 
confusion, some, eg, CGAP, now prefer microbanking to connotate small-scale financial 
intermediation, but along commercial lines.  
 
To the extent that only relatively poor people avail of small-scale financial services and 
bother to spend their time on weekly meetings or take repayments worth a few dollars 
directly to their MFI, microfinance also refers to the provision of financial services to low-
income individuals, households and enterprises. For reasons of cost effectiveness, small   6
loans under microfinance are usually secured by collateral substitutes, including joint liability 
for group loans and informal, unregistered mobile collateral for individual loans.  As collateral 
is informal, so is frequently the process of seizure. This represents one of the strengths of 
MFIs, as claims to formal collateral such as land can rarely be enforced through the judiciary. 
 
MFIs are defined here as formal, semiformal or informal institutions providing financial 
services (microsavings, microcredit, microinsurance) of a scale significantly below those of 
commercial banks and to customers normally considered unbankable. Formal financial 
institutions, among them banks and finance companies, fall under a financial institutions law 
and are supervised by a financial authority such as the central bank or bank 
superintendency. Semiformal institutions, among them credit NGOs and most savings & 
credit cooperatives, are registered or otherwise officially recognized, but not financially 
regulated and supervised. Informal institutions of traditional or recent origin, among them 
self-help groups (such as rotating or accumulating savings and credit associations) and 
individual lenders or deposit collectors are neither officially regulated nor recognized, but 
may fall under customary law. Any such institution is referred to as a financial intermediary if 
it mobilizes deposits and transforms them into loans. An MFI is thus not a particular type of 
institution, but any type of institution offering small-scale financial services, usually to the 
poorer sections of society. Microfinance is thus not synonymous with credit NGOs! 
 
With regard to loan size, there is usually a wide gap between MFIs and commercial banks, 
the former most likely averaging in the hundreds and sometimes lower thousands of USD 
and the latter in the tens or hundreds of thousands of USD and above. Agricultural and other 
development banks frequently offer medium or large-scale as well as microfinance services. 
There is no way of generally defining microfinance in terms of size, as there is wide variation 
between countries. 
 
Mesofinance is a new term suggested here to connotate the next rung on the ladder of 
institutional size, referring to financial services beyond the scope of most MFI but still far 
below that of commercial banks. One implication is that, given a general reluctance against 
joint liability beyond a certain magnitude of loans, mesofinance mostly refers to individual 
loans backed by collateral rather than peer guarantees. Collateral may be formal or 
nonformal, but is likely to be more formal if larger and longer-term loans are involved. 
 
The new world of rural and microfinance: institutional perspectives 
 
In an increasing number of countries, there have been notable changes to varying degrees 
from the old world of directed credit to a new world of sustainable institution building. In this 
new world, governments make determined efforts to create conducive policy environments:  
 
•  with new legal forms for local financial institutions,  
•  deregulated interest rates, and  
•  prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions,  
•  paralleled by a deregulation of foreign exchange and the trade regime.  
 
 
Responding to the demands of their customers, institutions undergo reform and provide an 
array of savings and credit products for a wide range of income-generating activities, thereby 
generating the loanable funds and the profits needed for expansion. A number of agricultural 
and rural banks, cooperatives and other MFIs have learned to manage their risks by: 
 
•  diversifying their portfolio,  
•  analysing the investment and repayment capacity of the entire household,  
•  providing a range of appropriate financial services,  
•  starting small and granting repeat loans of increasing size,    7
•  providing incentives to both staff and borrowers to enforce timely repayment,  
•  changing from group to individual loans and offering opportunities for graduation to 
larger loans as need be, and  
•  expanding into remote areas through linkages with self-help groups.  
 
The transition from the old to the new world of rural and development finance, as described 
in the following matrix, is a challenging framework to any institution and donor agency aiming 
at sustainable development, including the promotion of commodities.  
 
Table 1:  From the old world of directed credit to the new world of financial systems 
       development and institution-building in rural and microfinance 
     
  Don’t support :: 
The old world of directed credit 
Do support: 
The new world of institution-building 
Policy environment   Financial repression   Prudential deregulation, fin. system dev 
Legal framework  Lack of private local R/MFIs   New legal forms for local R/MFs 
Develop’t approach  Supply-driven  Demand-driven  
Institutional focus  Monopoly institutions   Various competing financial institutions 
Clients perceived as:  Beneficiaries  Customers 
Selection of clients  Targeting by donors and governments  Self-selection 
Outreach  Limited outreach to groups   Potentially all segments of the economy  
Incentives  Perverse: leading to fund misallocation   Efficient allocation of funds 
Non-formal FIs   Millions of informal MFIs ignored  Opportunities for mainstreaming  
Semiformal FIs/NGO  No standards, no deposit mobilization  Conversion to deposit-taking formal FIs  
Financial coops   Unsupervised, ruined by governments  Self-reliance; low costs, expansion  
AgDBs    Lack of viability and outreach  Reforms towards autonomy, viability 
Rural banks (RBs)  Lack of opportunities for private RBs   Legal framework for private RBs 
Regulation and 
supervision (R&S) 
Coops, MFIs, AgDBs unsupervised; 
donors keep distressed institutions alive  
MF units in CBs; regulation of RBs/ 
MFIs; closing of distressed FIs 
Commercial banks  Unable to lend to a variety of sectors   Some outreach to commodity 
producers and microentrepreneurs  
Agricultural finance  Lack of self-financing; restricted credit 
according to government directions 
Self-financing from savings; external 
financing for profitable investments  
Commodity finance  Restricted to production of selected 
crops 




Futile attempts of donors to drive ill-
suited MFIs into remote areas 
Self-managed savings-based SHGs 
and cooperatives operating at low cost 
Individual and group 
technologies: 
Rigid replications without growth of 
outreach and sustainability 
Both can be profitable and reach 
microentrepreneurs and the poor 
Non-financial 
services  
Maximalist approach without cost 
coverage undermines FIs 
Provided by SHGs, other agencies, FI 
subsidiaries; balance of objectives 
Targeting  Undermines outreach and viability  Differentiated financial products  
Linking banks and 
SHGs/MFIs (LBS) 
Lack of healthy banks with a mandate 
to be of service 
Spectacular increase in outreach to the 
poor; profitable if interest rates are free 
Interlinked schemes  Lack of institutional sustainability   Ltd.success under controlled conditions  
Self-reliance  NGOs, AgDBs barred from deposit-
taking; donor and gov. dependency 
Self-financing through deposits and 
profits; institutional autonomy  
Sustainability  Donors, gov. fail to insist on perform-
ance standards and sustainability  
Increasing numbers of self-sustaining 
institutions of any type and ownership 
Access to financial 
services 
No access of many poor and non-poor 
to savings, credit, insurance 
Sustainable access of the poor as 
users and owners of R/MF institutions 
 
 
The challenge:  
taking commodity finance into the new world of micro- and mesofinance 
 
This transition to a new world of finance, as promising as it looks, has only just started. 
Neither does it cover all developing countries; not does it cover all institutions and spheres of   8
the economy in those countries where it has commenced. In most countries, the situation is 
highly complex and frequently contradictory. Eg, failing and prospering institutions may exist 
side by side; governments pass laws on market-driven institutions, yet continue subsidizing 
the interest rates of others; agricultural development banks and commercial banks – facing 
high minimum reserve requirements and and high T-bill rates and plagued by weak lending 
technologies - may produce huge amounts of excess liquidity, yet the government borrows 
money from international donors and increases its external debts. On the whole, despite all 
the promising beginnings, the rural areas and the wide field of commodity finance have been 
least touched by these changes. Once it was savings
9, now it is agricultural credit that is the 
forgotten half of rural finance. There lies an enormous underutilized potential!  
 
 
3.  Lessons taught by international experience: What matters in micro- and 
            mesofinance? 
 
Due to the overall failure of donor-driven directed credit, the emphasis in development policy 
has shifted to (rural) financial systems development and the building of self-reliant, 
sustainable institutions. Regardless of ownership, type of institution, rural or urban sphere of 
operation and target group, financial institutions ultimately all have to accomplish the 
following: 
￿ mobilize their own resources through savings 
￿ have their loans repaid 
￿ cover their costs from their operational income 
￿ earn enough profits to offset the effects of inflation  
￿ finance their expansion from their profits and savings mobilized. 
 
Box 1: Requirements of sustainable micro- and mesofinance  
Sustainable financial institutions mobilize their own resources, provide financial services according to 
demand, cover their costs from their operational income, have their loans repaid, make a profit, and 
finance their expansion from deposits and retained earnings. Resource mobilization comprises equity, 
savings deposits, retained earnings and commercial borrowings, augmented by external resources 
such as soft loans and grants. Of these resources, three are fundamental to self-reliance and 
dynamic growth: savings deposits and equity including retained earnings. Financial services comprise 
credit for various purposes and savings deposit facilities; they may further include money transfer, 
check clearing and insurance. Insurance may serve the triple function of borrower protection, loan 
protection and resource mobilization. Sustainable institutions need an appropriate legal status which 
authorizes them to carry out all these functions; and they need to be properly regulated and 
effectively supervised.  Financial systems development comprises processes of establishing a 
conducive regulatory environment (including a legal framework, prudential norms and effective 
supervision), an adequate infrastructure of viable small and large financial institutions, adequate 
demand-oriented financial products and good operational practices.  
 
In addition to these fundamentals, a wealth of lessons have been taught by international 
experience, but not always learned by donors and governments. The lessons are complex 
and are presented in more detail in the background paper, but for actual implementation 
require further reading of the reference literature and selected exposure visits.  
 
What matters to the poor: 
￿ First of all, client experience matters. Clients have experienced in projects that credit 
can make them poorer or richer 
￿ The poor themselves matter … and so do the non-poor. Their autonomy in self-
selection, instead of targeting, should be respected, also on separate vs. mixed 
institutions of women and men 
                                                 
9 Robert Vogel, Savings Mobilization: The Forgotten Half of Rural Finance. Pp. 248-265 in: 
D.W.Adams, D.H. Graham & J.D. Von Pischke, Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit. 
Westview Press, Boulder 1984.   9
￿    Access to savings and credit matters – far more than interest rates. 
￿    Rural enterprise viability matters and is mutually reinforcing with R/MFI viability.  
￿    Household portfolio diversification matters; but group enterprises have usually failed. 
 
What matters in terms of origin, history and culture: 
￿    Informal finance matters, particularly in the form of self-help groups (SHGs). 
Upgrading and mainstreaming through networking and linking them to banks are two 
ways in which donors can support expansion of outreach and financial deepening.  
￿    History matters. MFIs in Europe, since 1720, have started from informal beginnings 
and evolved, through appropriate regulation and supervision, to cooperative banks 
and savings banks. Microfinance is not a poor solution for poor countries!  
￿    Crisis matters. Financial innovations typically emerge in response to crisis. 
￿    Development matters: Microfinance is no panacea; it requires a climate of broader 
development to be fully effective 
￿    Culture matters. Development from above, through the established authorities, is 
more effective in hierarchical or closed societies; development from below, through 
participatory processes, is more effective in segmentary or open societies.  
 
What matters at the level of financial systems: 
￿ Financial systems matter. Donors can contribute to that evolution, but only in a long-
range perspective and in a donor-coordinated and goal-oriented manner.  
￿ Financial sector policy matters, particularly interest rate deregulation.  
￿ The legal framework matters. Appropriate legal forms allow people to establish their 
own financial institutions in private, cooperative or community ownership. 
￿ Capital matters, but should be mainly used in bridging temporary shortages in funds  
￿ Savings matter, as a service to the poor and as a source of loanable funds.  
￿ Financial intermediation matters: savings-first for low-yielding activities; and credit-
first for high-yielding activities - depending on the rate of return. 
￿ Interest rates on deposits matter, preventing the erosion of capital 
￿ Interest rates on loans matter, covering all costs. 
￿ Institutions matter (projects don’t, providing continuity and efficiency. Donors must 
abstain from perverse incentives which enable institutions to maintain unviable 
operations. 
￿ Competition matters, entailing institutional diversity and pressures to perform.  
￿ Prudential regulation and supervision matter,  requiring the political will and institu-
tional capacity to enforce standards in rural banks, SACCOs, AgDBs, other R/MFIs. 
￿ Knowledge matters. Effective knowledge management Is urgently needed. 
 
What matters at the level of institutions: 
￿ Institutional reform matters: There are striking cases of reform of very different types 
of institutions, with great benefit to the poor, leaving no excuse for continual support 
to unviable institutions.  
￿  Ownership and institutional autonomy matter; but management autonomy in terms of 
customer selection and loan decisions may be more important than ownership   
￿ Viability, efficiency, sustainability and self-reliance matter. Donors should support 
domestic resource mobilization, cost-effectiveness, and profitability. 
￿  Saver and borrower outreach matter, which is compatible with sustainability.  
￿  Sustainable outreach to marginal rural areas requires support for the primacy of 
savings and self-financing; and of member-owned SHGs operating at low costs. 
￿  Lending technology matters – and should not be a matter of ideology: group 
technologies for the very poor; Individual technologies for graduating to larger loans . 
￿  MFI portfolio diversification matters as a risk management strategy.  
￿  Good practices matter, not best practices, which lead to inappropriate replications. 
￿  Institutional size matters. There is no best practice in terms of size, both small and 
large institutions can be feasible. 
￿  Profits matter, as a source of capital and a major determinant of growth of outreach.   10 
￿  Incentives matter, as a major determinant of quality of performance and profits.  
￿  Repayment matters. Many institutions now know how to reach repayment near 100%.  
￿  Financial products and delivery systems matter: demand-oriented and cost-effective.  
￿  Loan protection matters. Insurance is a service, but also part of loan protection. 
 
4.  Financial technologies: group vs. individual 
 
The financing of agricultural processing and its related activities – production and trade – 
faces two technologies: group or individual.  Lending technology is widely a matter of 
ideology, each with its own adherents, justifications, donors and conventions. Prominent 
proponents of the individual lending technology are USAID and HIID (with BRI as one of their 
disciples, after a disastrous experience with group lending during the days of directed credit) 
and Frankfurt-based IPC with its microenterprise banks (with Centenary RDB as one its 
disciples and numerous offsprings in Eastern Europe and the Balkans). Among the 
proponents of the group technology are the Grameen Bank and replicators, FINCA’s village 
banks, the majority of NGOs, and, still to a large extent, the Microcredit Summit. However, 
choice of technology should not be a question of ideology but of proven practice. Either one 
can be done well or poorly; each is a particular form of social capital, with has its strengths 
and weaknesses – and its realm of applicability. 
 
Sound individual technologies are based on the following: the analysis of the total 
household as a complex IGA entity; an incentives-driven repeat loan system, providing 
access to lower-interest automatic loans; flexible but comprehensive loan security 
requirements, including mobile and immobile collateral; and stringent enforcement of timely 
repayment, backed up by a system of computerized daily loan tracking, instant recovery 
action and seize of collateral (such as a cow, refrigerator, bicycle), customer incentives, and 
staff performance incentives at all levels of the bank. 
 
An example is Centenary RDB, which was reformed by IPC . There are numerous other 
examples, including Equity Building Society in Kenya and most rural banks in Indonesia and 
the Philippines. One of them is New Rural Bank of Victorias on Negros Island, which has 
experimented with AsDB/IFAD-supported Grameen banking and USAID-supported individual 
lending. Unlike Enterprise Bank (see below), it found individual lending profitable and group 
lending a failure.  
 
Sound group technologies vary widely. Many so-called group lending approaches do not 
involve lending to groups as legal borrowers, but lending to individuals through solidarity 
groups with joint liability, as in the case of BAAC in Thailand.  The group technology with the 
widest outreach world-wide is Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups, practiced in various 
countries in Asia and Africa, linking either existing SHGs (as in Indonesia and Nigeria) or 
newly established SHGs (as in India) to banks. In Indonesia, by 1998, 800 rural banks and 
16,000 SHGs of both men and women, poor and non-poor, were involved, without external 
capital funds. The largest outreach is in India, again without external capital influx, involving 
702,000 newly established SHG (predominantly of very poor women)  with 12 million 
members and a population of 60 million of India’s poor behind them, linked to some 20,000 
bank branches refinanced by NABARD (March 2003 data). What distinguishes linkage 
banking from other group approaches is the treatment of SHGs as autonomous local 
financial intermediaries, selecting their borrowers, carrying out creditworthiness examinations 
and determining their own interest rates and other loan terms. Linkage banking is closely 




   11 
The best publicized group approach is that of the Grameen Bank, which evolved in 
Bangladesh under conditions of financial repression. Its success is explained by its social 
capital, a self-regulated normative framework which prescribes its operations in detail
10: 
 
•  a focus on poor women, gathering detailed target group information and using 
rigid selection criteria to bar the non-poor from access to its services 
•  organizing the prospective borrowers in groups of five and centers of about six 
groups each which in turn come under a Grameen branch 
•  a credit-first program design, initially financed with donor or government funds 
•  internal resource mobilization through a compulsory savings component, 
supplemented by external donor or commercial resources 
•  reliance on peer pressure and joint liability of solidarity groups as a special type of 
risk management, which allows Grameen to lend without collateral 
•  strict credit discipline with absolute insistence on timely repayment (except during 
natural disasters)  
•  weekly center meetings with compulsory punctual attendance, where a pledge is 
sung and payments are transacted with a Grameen branch officer in the presence 
of all members 
•  special conditions of financial contracts, comprising a series of one-year repeat 
loans to individual borrowers at market rates of interest, starting small (around 
$50) and, contingent upon  the group members’ repayment performance, growing 
bigger in predetermined steps and amounts, repayable in weekly instalments, with 
a five percent up-front deduction to be paid into the group’s emergency loan fund 
•  adoption of Grameen’s Ten Decisions of personal discipline to be followed in 
one’s daily life, such as growing fruits and vegetables in the backyard; abstention 
from drinking, smoking and gambling; improving one’s housing; building latrines; 
safe drinking water for better health; investing in the children’s education 
•  intensive training of members and staff to adopt the attitudes, practices and 
underlying norms and values of the Grameen approach. 
 
Many NGOs in various countries have replicated Grameen, none with Grameen’s 
national scale and legal status of a national bank; only few have achieved 
satisfactory outreach and sustainability. Grameen replication in the Philippines during 
the first half of the 1990s was largely a failure. This changed after PCFC, with 
support from AsDB and IFAD, provided liquidity amounting to $34.1m to replicators, 
comprising NGOs, cooperatives, rural banks, rural cooperative banks and thrift 
banks. Lending is for productive purposes only, with a main emphasis on rural 
microenterprise activities such as processing and trading.  162 MFIs have adopted 
GBA as a financial product, on-lending funds at widely varying commercial interest 
rates designed to cover all costs and allow for a profit. For 436,000 microenterprise 
clients – 98% of them women, –, they provide access to financial services. Most 
collection rates of participating MFIs are in the range of 94%-100%, averaging 
96.2%. The original emphasis on NGOs and cooperatives has shifted to banks, 
particularly rural banks, while some of the major NGOs involved have themselves 
established banks. Much of the success is due to three factors: the insistence on 
profitability resulting from high interest rates, high repayment rates and large 
outreach; flexibility and innovation; and a shift to rural banks as the strongest 
intermediaries.
11 (IFAD 7/2002) 
                                                 
10 From CARD Operations Manual. CARD Research Unit, San Pablo City, The Philippines, 4/1998 
11 An example is Producers Rural Banking Corporation with12 branches. In four years, it built up a 
clientele of 12,519 Grameen borrowers with loans outstanding (73% of its total borrowers; 13% of total   12 
 
 
 Beyond ideology:  The evidence from various developing countries shows that both 
individual and group technologies can either fail or succeed; each one can be done 
well or poorly. The two technologies are complementary, as each has its own 
weakness:  
￿  in the case of Grameen banking (but not linkage banking): limitations of loan 
size and resistance against joint liability for other than very small loans;  
￿  in the case of individual lending: limitations of outreach.  
 
Group technologies with joint liability function only at the level of small loan sizes. A 
way out found by banks and cooperatives in the Philippines is graduation, combining 
initial group lending with opportunities for graduating to larger-scale individual loans 
for the more enterprising poor. 
 
 
5.   Supply-side issues:  
lack vs. abundance of finance for commodity-related investments 
 
Lack of finance for commodity-related investments in most cases… 
 
There are stark contrasts in the problem situation between different areas and institutions.  
The first issue pertains to the availability of finance for activities along the commodity chain.  
There are two basic problems here: one is the lack, the other one the abundance of financial 
resources, both resulting, paradoxically, in a lack of resources for commodity finance. 
 
In many areas, there is: 
 
￿ a lack of loanable funds, or an absence of financial institutions willing or able to lend 
for agriculture and the commodity chain; if one of the major rural market segments – 
commodity producers, rural industries, or traders – has no access to finance, the 
whole rural economic sector suffers. 
 
Most AgDBs and credit NGOs are not authorized to collect voluntary savings;  others have 
an inadequate branch and agency network, like the Agricultural Cooperative Bank in Syria; or 
they refuse to accept savings because they are afraid of losing them, like ACC in Jordan. As 
FAO & GTZ stated, just at a time of expanding market conditions for agriculture, “the number 
of donor-supported agricultural credit programmes is in decline and there is little evidence, in 
many countries, that governments or commercial financial intermediaries are compensating 
for the reduction in supply of loanable funds to agricultural production, processing, and 
marketing.”
12 As noted by the Common Fund, agricultural input finance has been declining 
since the early 1990s as a result of liberalisation and the dismantling of commodity boards. 
This has led to a reduction in agricultural production and yields, deterioration in quality, 
                                                                                                                                                   
loans outstanding) and 21,000 Grameen depositors (41% of its depositors; 4% of total deposits). 
Producers Bank is one of the few which has calculated the profitability of the Grameen product: its 
ROA on Grameen operations is 5.3%, and on non-Grameen 1.5%; its ROE on Grameen is 105.6% 
and on non-Grameen 11.2%. Producers Bank uses Grameen banking as an instrument for the 
vigorous expansion of its branch network and has proposed Franchising Grameen as a BOT strategy. 
Another case is Enterprise Bank, with 8 branches and 10 satellite offices. Like New Rural Bank of 
Victorias, it has experimented with both individual lending under USAID/MABS and Grameen lending 
under PCFC, but with different results:  Among its 20,944 borrowers are 14,540 under GBA (69%; 
41% of loans outstanding) and 842 under MABS (4%; 5% of loans outstanding); past-due rates are 
1.0% under Grameen and 5.6% under MABS (3.2% consolidated); in 2001, 60% of profit were derived 
from microlending, virtually all of this from Grameen banking.  
12 FAO & GTZ, Agricultural Finance Revisited: Why? AFR No. 1, June 1998, p. iii   13 
reduced investments, a decline in income of small producers, and an aggravation of 
poverty.
13 In many cases, rural financial institutions give preference to financing those 
commodities which allow for deduction at source within a single-channel marketing system; 
among them are BNDA in Mali, CNCA in Burkina Faso, FECECAM in Bénin and the 
SACCOs in Kenya. Once the single-buyer privilege (monopsony) is abolished, seasonal 
finance dries up. There is anecdotal evidence (as in our first case study above) of  a 
tendency for farmers to finance (low-yielding) agricultural investments from savings and use 
expensive credit for high-yielding non-farm investments, including agricultural processing.  
We hope that institutions or countries will learn from conference participants: 
 
•  How to mobilize savings as a source of loanable funds 
•  How to access capital markets as sources of refinance  
•  How to introduce competitive rates of interest on deposits and loans 
•  How to have their loans repaid and make a profit 
•  How to manage their risks through portfolio diversification (including commodies), 
total household analysis, and instant information and action on arrears. 
 
… vs. abundance of finance in some cases 
 
In contrast, in a number of other cases, there is  
 
￿ an abundance of loanable funds due to successful savings mobilization. 
 
In many rural institutions offering financial products without a credit bias, the ratio between 
borrowers and savers is between 1:6 and 1:10; and deposits exceed loans outstanding. This 
excess liquidity, though generated in rural areas, is thus not available for commodity finance 
and other purposes; instead, it is siphoned off to urban areas. 
 
The case of BRI: A prominent case in Asia is the Microbanking Division of Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, a government-owned AgDB. Reformed in 1984, it shifted from social to commercial 
lending and from group to individual technologies. Thereby, it expanded its outreach from 
700,000 subsidized borrowers in 1983 to 3 million borrowers at market rates and 27 million 
savings accounts in just 20 years. The Division is highly profitable: Its portfolio-at-risk (PAR) is a 
mere 2.3%, its return on average assets (ROAA) 1.6%.
14 However, since the mid-1990s, its 
excess liquidity has exceeded one million US$ every year; its lending ratio (loans/deposits) in 
2001 was 41%.
15 Profits and deposits generated at village level are siphoned off. 
 
The case of Centenary Rural Development Bank: CRDB in Uganda, with a sizeable agricultural 
lending program, has a similar experience. With reforms started in 1993, it has mastered the art 
of rural banking, with a portfolio-in-arrears ratio (PAR) between  2.1% and 3.1% during 2000-02 
– and a lower-than-average PAR in its chief agricultural branch in Mbale, which focusses on 
coffee; its ROAA in 2002 was 4%, its return on average equity (ROAE) 27%. It has 31,500 
borrowers with a volume of  $ 23.05m loans outstanding and ten times as many depositors, 
namely 316,650, with $ 48.7m in deposits (Dec. 2002). In 2002, the bank  added mesofinance to 
microfinance and succeeded in increasing its lending ratio from 35% in 2001 to 47% in 2002, 




                                                 
13 CFC Annual Report 2001, Amsterdam, p. 159. 
14 H. D. Seibel & P. Schmidt, How an Agricultural Development Bank Revolutionized 
Rural Finance:  The Case of Bank Rakyat Indonesia. IFAD Rural Finance Working Paper B5, 
1999/2000;  
W. Hiemann,  Case Study BRI, Indonesia. Pp. 71-134 in GTZ, The Challenge of Sustainable 
Outreach. GTZ, Eschborn 1/2003. 
15 Eg, US$ 1.27 billion in 2001 (deposits US$ 2.16 billion; loans outstanding US$ 0.89 billion). 
16 H. D. Seibel, Centenary Rural Development Bank, Uganda: A Flagship of Rural Bank Reform in 
Africa. Small Enterprise Development Journal 14, no. 3 (Sept. 2003), pp. 35-46   14 
We hope that such surplus institutions will learn from conference participants: 
 
•  How to combine group and individual technologies (like Commercial Microfinance Ltd. 
in Uganda) or to link up with SHGs to increase outreach to both the poor and the non-
poor (like the rural banks in  India and Indonesia and Union Bank in Nigeria) 
•  How to develop appropriate financial products, including tied savings-cum-credit 
products (like the Banque Nationale Agricole in Tunisia), term loans (like BAAC in 
Thailand), leasing (like agricultural banks in Sudan), warehouse receipt-financing (as 
in Ethiopia and Zambia, with support from the CFC) 
•  How to diversify their portfolio to include commodity finance (like Equity Building 
Society, a commercially operating MFI in Kenya) 
•  How to move from micro- to mesofinance to increase the lending ratio (like Centenary 
RDB). 
 
In sum, the major outstanding supply-side issues are:  
 
￿ How to step up savings mobilization as a source of self-financing for financial 
institutions as well as  for farmers and microentrepreneurs 
￿ How to increase outreach to the poor and non-poor, including producers along the 
commodity chain 
￿ Portfolio diversification of institutions and of farmers and microentrepreneurs, 
comprising activities along the commodity chain and non-farm activities 
￿ Extension of deposit mobilization and lending from micro- to mesofinance, including 
the flexible use of group and individual technologies for commodity finance 
￿ How to manage commodity-related risks. 
￿ How to build links with non-financial institutions to ensure the availability of inputs, 
output marketing and other support services 
￿ How to use non-conventional forms of collateral, such as warehouse receipts and 
crop hypothecation in an era of economic liberalisation.  
 
As an outcome, different bundles of lessons might emerge for different stakeholders: 
producers, agribusiness, financial institutions, governments, donors and farmer 
organizations. 
 
6.   Agricultural finance: how to manage its risks 
 
Is agricultural (micro- and meso-) finance really risky and unprofitable? 
 
There is no doubt that agricultural and commodity finance face high levels of risk: climatic, 
economic, technical and political. These risks may be covariant, affecting many borrowers in 
a given area. For reasons of risk management, farmers may prefer traditional agricultural 
varieties and practices which less profitable but also less hazardous. These may be 
paralleled by modern cash crops which promise higher profits but are also more hazardous. 
Furthermore, the budgets of farmers and microentrepreneurs are integrated into their 
household budgets, and expenditures for agricultural and non-agricultural, consumption and 
social purposes may be closely linked. In a number of cases, the belief of CEOs and donors 
in unsurmountable problems of rural and commodity finance has turned into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, either by categorically excluding this type of finance, or when giving it a try, failing 
because loan officers are not experienced and not convinced.  
 
If one moves up the scale from micro to meso, the situation changes. There is a trade-off 
between diversification and specialisation. Access to global markets requires producers to 
specialise, adopting high-yielding varieties and benefiting from economies of scale. They 
may have to adopt risk pooling mechanisms (eg, insurance, price stabilisation funds, futures) 
instead of diversifying into a range of small scale activities. Non-financial institutions and 
governments may have an important role to play in this kind of risk management to facilitate   15 
investments in the commodity sub-sectors and to stimulate the flow of finance from the 
private sector. 
 
Some flagships of rural and agricultural micro- and mesofinance
17 
Experience around the developing world shows that virtually any type of financial institution, 
including commercial banks staying away from agriculture, can fail in the face of bad policy 
or bad management. On the other hand, experience also shows that any type of rural 
financial institution, once reformed and well-managed, can provide finance in a profitable and 
sustainable way for a variety of activities including those along the commodity chain – some 
with a stronger emphasis on commodity production, others on processing and trade. Among 
these are:  
 
￿ AgDBs like BNDA in Mali and CNCA in Burkina Faso (both with monopsonistic 
relations to organised commodity sectors), BNA in Tunisia, BK in Iran, BRI in 
Indonesia, BAAC in Thailand 
￿ Rural and community banks, eg, in Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, the Philippines and 
Indonesia  
￿ Commercial  mesobanks like Centenary RDB in Uganda, CMF in Uganda, 
EBS in Kenya, Banco Caja Social in Colombia, Bank Dagang Bali in 
Indonesia, Micro Enterprise Bank (MEB) in Bosnia  
￿ Financial cooperatives like SACCOs in Kenya and Tanzania, credit unions in 
Madagascar, People’s Credit Funds in Vietnam, savings and credit cooperatives in 
the Philippines 
￿ NGOs like CHF/JACP in Jordan, UMU in Uganda, EKI in Bosnia, ASA in 
Bangladesh  
￿ Credit-NGOs establishing banks like K-Rep in Kenya, CARD and others in the 
Philippines, Bina Swadaya, Purba Danarta and others in Indonesia, and, soon, in 
Uganda 
￿ Member-owned village funds like sanadiq in Syria and SHGs linked to banks in India 
and Indonesia. 
 
Finance as a commercial proposition 
 
For these institutions and their customers, rural and agricultural finance has turned into a 
commercial proposition. Their experience has demonstrated that the social and economic 
objectives of rural and agricultural development are best achieved not by charity, but by 
financial relations between institutions and their customers based on commercial principles: 
mobilizing financial resources locally; having their loans repaid; covering their costs; and 
financing the expansion of outreach from deposits and retained earnings. Such institutions 
may profitably include commodity finance: not as their sole objective, but as part of a 
commercially balanced portfolio. The frontier of finance lies in a progressively extended 
balance between purely commercial and developmental objectives. It is hoped that, as 
financial institutions contribute to the growth and profitability of small and microenterprises 
along the commodity chain, their loans to that sub-sector increase in size and profitability; 
and what may appear as social banking at the onset turns into commercial banking.  
 
Risk management strategies in rural and agricultural finance 
 
The issue is thus not whether rural and agricultural finance face particular problems, but that 
these problems are surmountable and have in fact been solved by a number of institutions, 
some of which are present in this conference. These institutions have developed a range of 
risk management strategies for the financing of agricultural and other rural investments, 
                                                 
17 In this context, the term microfinance institution (MFI) covers all institutions which provide 
microfinance services; in addition, such institutions – eg, AgDBs – may also serve big customers such 
as big farmers, plantations and rural industries.   16 
including those along the commodity chain. A detailed list, which should be of particular 
interest to rural and agricultural finance institutions, is presented in Annex 1. Some 
illustrations of risk management strategies are given below: 
 
Managing systemic risks: 
 
Co-variance of risks:  Portfolio diversification  
Weather-related risks:  Expansion of outreach to wider area and different crops 
Market-related risks:  Contract farming; commodity price risk insurance  
Policy –related risks:  Policy dialog and policy adjustment 
Political risks:  Insisting on institutional autonomy  
 
Managing idiosyncratic customer risks: 
 
Adverse selection:  Incremental lending based on track record 
Moral hazard:  Rigid loan examination, monitoring and enforcement 
Financial technology:  Graduating from small group loans to larger individual loans 




Providing opportunities for savings accumulation  
Inadequate skills:  Linking financial services with training and technical services (BDS) 
 
Managing credit risks: 
 
Loan examination:  Meeting solvent demand only; establishing total track record 
Loan terms:  Appropriate loan sizes and disbursement times 
Timely repayment:  Customer incentives for timely repayment ; instant recovery action 
Lack of collateral:  Warehouse receipts; non-formal collateral; joint liability  
Lack of enforcement:  Cooperation with local authorities to enforce repayment  
Staff ability:  Capacity building through training, distance learning, exposure training  
Institutional efficiency:  Rationalizing products and procedures  
Financial innovations:  Market research; pilot-testing of new products 





Managing transaction costs: 
 
Remote areas:  Linking with SHGs; outgrower schemes 
High operational costs:  Wholesaling; economies of scope through savings, credit and insurance  
Tied lending:  Financing provided through corporations  
 
Managing resource risks: 
 
Inadequate equity:  Equity participation by customers 
Inadequate funds:  Mobilizing savings; refinancing on national capital markets  
Interest rate risks:  Matching fixed vs. variable interest rates of  assets and liabilities 
Liquidity risks:   Liquidity exchange 
Lack of term finance:  Increasing equity and quasi-equity; promoting  term savings 
Donor funding:  Inviting equity participation, term loans, bridging loans  
 
Managing legal and institutional risks: 
 
Lack of legal framework:  Introducing appropriate legislation for rural banks and other MFIs  
Absence of lobbying:  Enhancing networks and associations of financial institutions 
Lack of R&S:  Promoting effective regulation & supervision of rural banks, AgDBs, MFIs 
Lack of collateral:  Liberalizing collateral legislation 
   17 
 
7.   Demand-side issues:  
abundance vs. dearth of opportunities for commodity-related investments 
 
Abundance of opportunities for commodity-related investments… 
 
Similar to the stark contrasts between different areas and institutions concerning the 
availability of finance, there are equally stark contrasts concerning the ability of rural people 
to find profitable investments along the commodity chain and others. In many areas, there is: 
 
￿ an abundance of investment opportunities and entrepreneurship relative to the 
available finance. 
 
Of course, this is the same as saying: there is a lack of finance for the existing demand, be it 
ample or limited. Thus, most institutions entering, or willing to expand, rural and agricultural 
finance will find a considerable amount of unsatisfied actual and potential demand, 
particularly for micro and small investments along the commodity chain.  The challenge is to 
enhance products and procedures to expand outreach beyond top-level clients. These 
institutions will greatly benefit from the experience of the institutions and agencies 
represented at this Conference and their risk management strategies as reported above.   
 
￿ Spreading the existing experience is thus the most promising strategy for rapidly 
expanding outreach to large numbers of the poor and other segments of the rural 
economy. 
 
…vs. dearth of investment opportunities – a new challenge 
 
Given the growth of savings, profits and other loanable funds in increasing numbers of rural 
microfinance institutions including some AgDBs, augmented by donor funds for poverty 
alleviation, there is a new tendency now for existing loanable funds to chase a limited 
number of rural entrepreneurs and investment opportunities. Thus, in a number of areas, 
there is: 
 
￿ a lack of investment opportunities and entrepreneurship relative to the available 
finance. 
 
Situations differ widely and pertain to all levels of investment size: from micro to small and 
medium. In some high opportunity areas, eg, in West and East Africa, MFIs now start 
reporting “too much competition”, which would of course be diminished if new investment 
opportunities could be opened up. In other areas, as in the Philippines, rural banks and other 
MFIs engaged in poverty lending on a commercial basis do very well with microloans for 
microinvestments, using the group lending technology. However, graduating clients to larger 
individual loans at lower interest rates has proven difficult. Rural banks have a strong interest 
deepening their outreach by helping clients across the poverty threshold with bigger loans, 
but are facing a lack of demand. Reasons may be variegated:  
 
•  profitable investment opportunities are not directly available; 
•  the rural poor are unable to take advantage of existing opportunities;  
•  or they are unwilling to face the substantially higher risks of bigger and longer-term 
loans; 
•  processing technologies are either lacking,  
•  or technological consulting services, agricultural extension services and business 
development services fail to reach down to the local level; 
•  financial products are not tuned to the cash flow of investors; 
•  markets are currently depressed, and investors disinclined to take on new risks. 
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There is thus an increasing need for developing new technologies, investment opportunities, 
market linkages, and local entrepreneurship. Over the past decade, microfinance has 
focused on the supply-side, particularly the enhancement of sustainable financial services. 
There is some discussion about Microfinance-Plus, ie, financial plus non-financial services. 
But most MFIs have been hesitant, despite tempting donor offers, to take on non-financial 
responsibilities, which may range from agricultural and technological advice to health and 




8.. Responding to the challenges of commodity finance and development 
 
In contrast to MFIs, the Common Fund has mainly (though not exclusively) focused on the 
demand-side, seeking solutions for a range of problems pertaining to pre-harvest productivity 
improvement, post-harvest processing, marketing and quality testing; and market expansion.  
This is in line with what we have called:  
 




How the Common Fund has promoted investment opportunities…  
 
Here are three examples how the CFC has promoted investments along the commodity 
chain: 
 
§ Improvement of Fonio Post-Harvest Technology: 
Fonio is a neglected traditional cereal grown in Sahel countries like Burkina Faso, Guinea and 
Mali, where governments are counting on the development of locally-grown food crops to reduce 
trade imbalances and external dependence. In 1997, the CFC has approved a project to 
stimulate production and consumption of fonio by improving post-harvest handling and 
processing. Project components include improvement of post-harvest handling,  processing 
techniques, the local designing and manufacturing of fonio machines, training of operators, 
urban and export marketing, and the dissemination of information on fonio post-harvest systems 
at national and regional levels. Beneficiaries have included craftsmen, who ensure local 
manufacture and distribution of the machinery, and microentrepreneurs, mostly women, who do 
the processing and marketing in rural and urban areas, furthermore farmers who increase their 
production and urban consumers. 
 
§ Production and Marketing of Value-Added Fishery Products: 
Nile perch has become a major semi-processed export commodity of the three countries 
adjoining Lake Victoria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, amounting to 150,000 tons per year. 
Only higher quality at all stages from catch to end product can improve expert earnings and 
ensure sustainable employment and income to the artisanal fishermen. In 1999, the CFC has 
approved a project promoting sophisticated value-added products and processing technologies. 
This is being complemented by  support for market research on commercial production and 
quality control. In addition, the project supports microfinance for the promotion of processing and 
marketing of declining traditional species (dagaa) for domestic consumption.  
 
§ Adding Value to African Leather:  
Leather is an important export product in eastern and southern Africa. Earnings depend very 
much on the quality of leather and leather products. In 2002, the CFC approved a project to 
improve processing after the tannery stage in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Zimbabwe.  The 
project strengthens trainings institutes with special equipment and technical personnel; assists 
selected production units through quality improvement, enhancement of marketing skills and 
design techniques; and encourages development banks to provide investment capital. Like all 
other CFC projects, it is a collaborative effort: It is implemented at the regional level by the 
COMESA Leather and Leather Products Institute and the Eastern and Southern African Leather 
Industry Association and at the national level by four collaborating institutions; the Sudan   19 
National Leather Technology Centre is one of them. The FAO Intergovernmental Sub-Group on 
Hides and Skins supervises the project. Beneficiaries are the small-scale producers, the training 
institutes, the exporting countries and the other countries in the COMESA Region. 
 
… and how this Conference might open up new avenues for commodity finance and 
development 
 
This Conference brings together the financial experience of rural and agricultural 
microfinance institutions and the experience of the Common Fund and other agencies with 
promoting commodities and small and microentrepreneurs producing, processing and 
marketing commodities. We expect that this will result in:   
 
￿ the further growth and development of sustainable financial services; and  
￿ the further growth and development of sustainable commodity-related enterprises. 
 
These two objectives – the growth of profitable local financial institutions and of profitable 
local enterprises – are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. There is one lesson to be 
learned from the now developed industrial countries: Focusing in an early stage of 
development on the poor, who largely depend on commodities, means focusing on a huge 
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Annex 1: Risk management strategies in rural and agricultural microfinance
18 
 
•  With regard to managing systemic risks: 
 
Co-variance of risks:  Portfolio diversification comprising farm and non-farm, rural and urban, 
short- and medium-term, consumer and emergency loans; financing 
commodity processing and trade in addition to production; hiring specialist 
rural and agricultural finance staff 
Weather-related risks:  Expansion of outreach to wider area and different crops, including 
traditional resistant varieties; insurance products; financing irrigation and 
water management  
Market-related risks:  Market information systems; contract farming; commodity price risk 
insurance (put options); agricultural price stabilisation; post-harvest storage 
development; warehouse receipts; linking producers, processors, traders; 
establishing input supply and marketing subsidiaries; tied savings-cum-
credit products;  
Policy –related risks:  Sound financial sector policies; macroeconomic stability; sound agricultural 
(price) policies; consistent policies regarding grants (eg, for institution-
building) and loans on market terms 
Political risks:  Desisting from political interference in operational decisions, insisting on 
the autonomy of FIs (to be protected by law and controlled by central 
bank); government or donor minority ownership; disconnecting financing 
from agricultural support and supervision; separating FIs from agriculture 
ministries, mass organizations;  bringing FIs under the supervision of the 
central bank. 
 
•  With regard to managing idiosyncratic customer risks: 
 
Adverse selection:  Initial loans based on savings record; borrower selection by peers-cum-
bank staff; credit information exchange (for larger loans) 
Moral hazard:  Repeat loans starting small; rigid loan examination, monitoring and 
enforcement; formal and informal collateral, joint liability and peer pressure; 
incentives for timely repayment 
 
Financial technology:  Starting with small loans through joint liability groups; providing 
opportunities for graduation to larger individual loans 
Investment failures:  Spreading the risk through household diversification, comprising farm and 
non-farm activities; facilitating technical support services and supply chain; 
providing appropriate technologies for commodity production, processing 
and inputs; financing storage infrastructure 
Inadequate customer 
self-financing capacity: 
Providing opportunities for savings accumulation including term savings; 
offering savings-cum-credit products; providing incentives for growth  
Inadequate skills of 
farmers and 
microentrepreneurs: 
Linking financial services with training and technical services (BDS); 
commercialising extension services; focusing on investments based on 
local knowledge; promoting the exchange of experience among investor-
borrowers; adopting a repeat-loan approach, starting small and permitting 
borrowers to learn through trial and error 
 
•  With regard to managing credit risks: 
 
Loan examination:  Meeting solvent demand only; establishing total track record; 
creditworthiness examination of the whole household with all activities and 
collateral, ascertaining total repayment capacity 
Loan terms:  Appropriate loan sizes and disbursement times; repeat loans of increasing 
size and decreasing interest rates 
Timely repayment:  Peer pressure; customer incentives for timely repayment (interest rate 
rebates, larger loans, automatic loans); staff performance incentives 
                                                 
18 The main concern here is with agricultural and commodity micro- and mesofinance. This overlaps 
widely with risk management strategies in rural and general microfinance.   21 
Lack of collateral:  Warehouse receipts; accepting non-formal collateral; joint liability for 
smaller loans; improving collateral legislation for R/MFIs (eg, at provincial 
level) incl. non-judicial foreclosure; improving collateral registration; 
leasing; partnerships with dealers 
Enforcement  of timely 
repayment: 
Instant information on loans due and overdue at all levels of the institution 
through efficient MIS/ICTs; instant recovery action, eg, seizure of non-
formal collateral 
Lack of enforcement:  Cooperation with local authorities to enforce repayment ; judicial reforms 
Staff ability:  Capacity building through training, distance learning, apprenticeship, 
exposure training in other institutions and programs; special training in 
commodity finance; setting up staff library; providing access to internet 
resources; facilitating (UNCDF) Microfinance Distance Learning Course 
Institutional efficiency:  Rationalizing procedures to arrive at competitive interest rates, 
differentiated by product 
Financial innovations:  Market research; joint pilot-testing with other MFIs; facilitating internet 
exchange on financial innovations; participating in networks, associations 
like Afraca/Apraca/Nenaraca 
Staff and management 
access to internet 
resources: 
CFC : http://www.common-fund.org  
CGAP: http://www.cgap.org; http://www.microfinancegateway.org/  
FAO: http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsm/RuralFinance  
International Food Policy Research Institute : http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/  
International Fund for Agricultural Development:  
http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/lle/themes/crfs.htm  
MicroSave Africa: http://www.microsave-africa.com  
Natural Resources Institute: http://www.nri.org/  
UNDP/UNCDF : http://www.uncdf.org/sum/  
World Bank Sustainable Banking with the Poor:  
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/financialsectorweb.nsf/  
 
•  With regard to transaction costs: 
 
Low population density, 
remote areas: 
Wholesaling; linking with SHGs as informal financial intermediaries; 
cooperation with NGOs, CBOs as facilitators; outgrower schemes; 
financing high-value crops and value-adding processing 
High operational costs:  Economies of scope through savings, credit and insurance services 
combined with wholesaling and linkage banking; lending to individuals 
through joint liability groups which process loan applications, disbursement 
and instalments; repeat loans to establish track record; incentives for timely 
repayment leading to automatic loans; improved bank automation software; 
temporary institutional subsidies for innovations 
ICTs  Internet banking; low-cost rural ATMs; Smart Cards 
Tied lending through 
corporations 
Financing provided through corporations (eg, sugar companies, seed 
producers, input suppliers, dairy companies, commodity boards): for inputs, 
against output, against warehouse receipts 
 
•  With regard to resource risks: 
 
Inadequate equity:  Building up equity, including equity participation by customers, commercial 
banks, others; increasing retained earnings; inviting quasi-equity (long-term 
refinancing); inviting international equity participation  
Inadequate loanable 
funds: 
Mobilizing savings through various products with positive real returns; 
refinancing on national capital markets; improving liquidity management; 
promoting refinancing relations between MFIs and commercial banks; 
providing guarantees from commercial bank loans to MFIs  
Interest rate risks:  Matching fixed vs. variable interest rates of  assets and liabilities 
Liquidity risks:   Establishing vertical and horizontal linkages between R/MFIs to facilitate 
liquidity exchange; access to lines of credit of commercial banks or 
rediscount facilities of central banks to cope with liquidity shortages; 
training staff in liquidity management 
Lack of term finance:  Increasing equity and quasi-equity; promoting  term savings, savings-cum-
credit products, short-term repeat loans   22 
Availability of donor 
funding: 
Inviting equity participation (at investor’s risk), term loans as quasi-equity, 
loans bridging temporary liquidity shortages; offering donor representatives 
a seat on the board  
 
•  With regard to legal and institutional risks: 
 
Lack of appropriate legal 
framework: 
Introducing appropriate legislation for rural banks and other MFIs; bringing 
AgDBs under banking law  
Absence of lobbying:  Enhancing networks and associations of financial institutions; promoting 
policy dialog with financial authorities, parlamentarians; disseminating 
information through media 
Lack of prudential 
regulation and effective 
supervision: 
Introducing effective regulation and supervision of rural banks, AgDBs, 
cooperatives, credit NGOs, other MFIs; enhancing the capacity of financial 
authorities 
Lack of collateral:  Reforming collateral legislation; using movable and nonformal collateral; 
policy dialog with central bank on joint liability with high repayment as 
collateral substitute; creating legal framework for leasing 
 